The Probability of a Metaphysics of Morals

Posted by Alisa on September 10th, 2018

Many philosophers across the spectrum have attempted to define and understand the human rationale behind morality. Questions of morality go deeper than simply what we ought to do. The purpose of this inquiry is thus to look at a deeper aspect of morality - to see if morality is relevant or possible for human beings from a metaphysical perspective - and what this means for morality in general.

In order to adequately make my point, I will first start out by making certain posits. The first of which will focus on common-sense morality and separating this from any abstract moral philosophy without practicality for the casual reader. I will make my argument in a series of essays, for which this will be the first of several in a major undertaking in moral thinking. Thus, the focus of this essay will rest on the question of only a possibility of metaphysics for morality, and where we can move from here.

This essay is not intended to be an inquiry of philosophy. While it may be deemed so, the actual purpose is to remove the abstract necessity behind moral philosophy and render the reader with something simple, comprehensive, and ultimately useful for his everyday life. While it is understandable that the average person has his own limited philosophical reflections; it is an unnecessary task on behalf of philosophers to attribute something to morality that is neither needed nor helpful. Thus, our inquiry into morality will be to find a practical solution in the form of a practical morality.

What does it mean to be moral? In common terminology, we hold our morality insofar as we think of them as abstract principles - to our own intuitions. These intuitions have in their origins our moral experiences. This source of morality is neither universally accepted nor justified in this article. The point, however, is not to prove the empirical basis of our everyday morality, but rather find an answer into the previously posed question, "why be moral?" Thus, the former claim that morality rests in our experience of what could resemble moral law is merely a posit, but I am willing to substitute my posit for other less commonly held views of morality which I feel my argument could equally dispel - that is deontological moral rationalism.

If we are to take morality as serious, then we must assess the task before us as a question not of normative ethics, but rather meta-ethics. An answer to our question of why be moral requires we lay our assumptions on the table from the beginning, and from these assumptions of what I shall call popular morality or "common-sense" morality we must determine the implications for morality in general; namely - what do these lead to or what would they require.

I leave it to the reader to take his own morality into question when assessing my argument and my essay. What I determine to be common-sense morality is a broad term that in no way can summarize or adequately cover the subjective views on morality that may be hold on various individuals. What we can do then is assume that for the practical purpose of our inquiry, that common-sense morality encompasses those moral feelings we have when we see those things that either elicit moral condemnation or moral praise. That is not to say our morals are merely reduced to intuitions, as that puts us in the pit of moral relativity for which I've no intention of doing. But rather, these intuitions are how we experience morality in the empirical sense. By the empirical sense I mean in our everyday world of objects - absent the metaphysical or extra-mental. The types of moral sentiments that I'm speaking of are the types we experience in our common, everyday reality - when we hear of a tragedy in the news or the sentiments that arise out of the altruistic actions of someone else.

From here we have arrived at a common-sense morality, for which if anybody shall take contention with I would be more than happy to alter my accepted definition, and put forth a new argument. But for now this definition shall suffice and I shall proceed with my argument.

Why have I gone at such lengths to try and define our morality? Well, first in order to answer our question, we have to establish the accepted basis of common-sense or popular morality; for which I have now done. Second of all, from here I will move to demonstrate the irrelevance of a metaphysics of morals. This is not a deep philosophic inquiry, but rather a descriptive posit of our own commonsense moral experiences.

By a metaphysics of morals, I specifically refer to the question of free-will. The concept of free-will depends greatly on our capacity to act as rational agents in moral experiences. This was the route taken by Kant and other deontological moral philosophers. However, by their own admission, we can never know if our will is free. This is true, for if the will exists in any sense it needs not be explained here that it is not something we can experience with our sense impressions.

So, I ask, what is the point? If we cannot even know we are in possession of a free-will then on what grounds can we move forward in assuming we have one? This is an enormous "leap of faith." But, Kant and other moral rationalists have tried to sweep this point of contention away as well; for, if we consider ourselves free as all human beings (rational beings) do, then we must be rational, and an elaborate circle follows. The problem with this, Kant really never gets out of this circle for which he posits free-will, autonomy, and the moral law all as analytic a priori propositions. We have never given the synthetic a priori propositions that truly break the circle. Thus, we can make a critical stab into the heart of deontological and rational moral philosophy: the lack of knowledge of a free-will leaves us only at speculation, and this speculation is hence insufficient grounds for a metaphysics of morals.

Kant's problem here lies not in his inquiry of morality, but rather his inquiry into questions of metaphysics and such grounding that may be necessary conditions for the possibility of having moral experiences. It is here that I agree with Kant that knowledge of our own free-will is something we can never know; where I challenge him is that we really shouldn't care. Such metaphysical questions do not bear significant meaning in everyday life, nor should they play such major roles in our moral experience. Thus, we should move from a speculative philosophy of morality to a popular practical morality in general.

Without the possibility of concrete knowledge of the metaphysical, how are we ever justified in taking our morality as a universal law? If there is no necessary condition making a priori moral experiences unique to the human being, or any rational being insofar as we can consider him rational, then we have no justification of universal law as such. This is neither unique nor original, however, and is reminiscent of the skepticism of David Hume.

This skepticism does not reduce to mere immorality but recognizing the limitations of our own understanding of the natural world and our supreme lack of knowledge in regards to anything that may exist outside of it. Such inquiries are necessary in order to get at the heart of morality. Such groundings (or deconstruction of) will lay the path for my next inquiry of morality - the question as to why be moral and whether or not we are ever justified in having such moral claims.